In reality, the DRIVER'S LICENSE has to do with the COMMERCIAL USAGE of the public roads which is a PRIVILEGE (AKA “driving a motor vehicle”).
VEHICLE CODE 310. A "driver's license" is a valid license to drive the type of motor vehicle or combination of vehicles for which a person is licensed under this code or by a foreign jurisdiction.
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/displaycode?section=veh&group=00001-01000&file=100-680 VEHICLE CODE 12500. (a) A person may not drive a motor vehicle upon a highway, unless the person then holds a valid driver's license issued under this code, except those persons who are expressly exempted under this code.(rest omitted)
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/displaycode?section=veh&group=12001-13000&file=12500-12527 VEHICLE CODE 14607.4. The Legislature finds and declares all of the following:
(a) Driving a motor vehicle on the public streets and highways is a privilege, not a right…
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/displaycode?section=veh&group=14001-15000&file=14600-14611 "The right to travel interstate by auto vehicle upon the public highways may be a privilege or immunity of citizens of the United States. Compare Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35. A citizen may have, under the Fourteenth Amendment, the right to travel and transport his property upon them by auto vehicle. But he has no right to make the highways his place of business by using them as a common carrier for hire. Such use is a privilege which may be granted or withheld by the state in its discretion, without violating either the due process clause or the equal protection clause. Packard v. Banton, 264 U.S. 140, 144 , 44 S. Ct. 257." BUCK v. KUYKENDALL, 267 U.S. 307 (1925)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/267/307.html "First. It is well established law that the highways of the state are public property; that their primary and preferred use is for private purposes; and that their use for purposes of gain is special and extraordinary, which, generally at least, the legislature may prohibit or condition as it sees fit. Packard v. Banton, 264 U.S. 140, 144 , 44 S.Ct. 257, and cases cited; Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. R.R. Comm., 271 U.S. 583, 592 , 593 S., 46 S.Ct. 605, 47 A.L.R. 457; Hodge Drive-It-Yourself Co. v. Cincinnati, 284 U.S. 335, 337 , 52 S.Ct. 144; Johnson Transfer & Freight Lines v. Perry (D.C.) 47 F.(2d) 900, 902; Southern Motorways v. Perry (D.C.) 39 F.(2d) 145, 147; People's Transit Co. v. Henshaw (C.C.A.) 20 F.(2d) 87, 89; Weksler v. Collins, 317 Ill. 132, 138, 139, 147 N.E. 797; Maine Motor Coaches v. Public Utilities, 125 Me. 63, 65, 130 A. 866. [287 U.S. 251, 265]” STEPHENSON v. BINFORD, 287 U.S. 251 (1932)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/287/251.html "The statute is framed upon the premise that the operation of a motor vehicle upon the public highways is the exercise **122 of a mere privilege, which may be denied, rather than a right. See, People v. Rosenheimer, 209 N.Y. 115, 120, 121, 102 N.E. 530, 532, 46 L.R.A.,N.S., 977; Heart v. Fletcher, 184 Misc. 659, 53 N.Y.S.2d 369.
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'The essence of the right to equal protection of the laws is that all persons similarly situated be treated alike.' Myer v. Myer, 271 App.Div. 465, 472, 66 N.Y.S.2d 83, 90, affirmed 296 N.Y. 979, 73 N.E.2d 562, citing Frost v. Corporation Commission, 278 U.S. 515, 522, 49 S.Ct. 235, 73 L.Ed. 483; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U.S. 96, 19 S.Ct. 609, 43 L.Ed. 909. The statute in question does affect alike all persons similarly situated, i. e., persons licensed to operate motor vehicles upon the highways of this state. The fact that it does not apply with equal force *51 to unlicensed operators is immaterial from the constitutional standpoint. The constitution does not require that a vehicle and traffic law shall apply equally in all respects to licensed and unlicensed operators of vehicles. The licensed operator possesses a qualified right granted by the state. He stands in a class different from an unlicensed operator of a vehicle and is subject to legislation specially applying to those persons in his class.” SCHUTT v. MAC DUFF (1954), 127 N.Y.S. 2d 116
And NOT the People's RIGHT to use those same roads for purposes of VEHICULAR TRAVEL.
SECTION 1. All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.
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SEC. 24. Rights guaranteed by this Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed by the United States Constitution...This declaration of rights may not be construed to impair or deny others retained by the people. CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION (1879)
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/.const/.article_1 The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people. Amendment IX, CONSTITUTION FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
http://www.archives.gov/national-archives-experience/charters/bill_of_rights_transcript.html 81. “Street” or “Highway.” “Street” or “highway” is a way or place of whatever nature open to the use of the public as a matter of right for purposes of vehicular travel. STATUTES OF CALIFORNIA 1935, Vehicle Code, Chapter 27, page 98.
VEHICLE CODE 2. The provisions of this code, insofar as they are substantially the same as existing provisions relating to the same subject matter, shall be construed as restatements and continuations thereof and not as new enactments.
VEHICLE CODE 4. No action or proceeding commenced before this code takes effect, and no right accrued, is affected by the provisions of this code, but all procedure thereafter taken therein shall conform to the provisions of this code so far as possible.
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/displaycode?section=veh&group=00001-01000&file=1-32 Personal liberty largely consists of the Right of locomotion -- to go where and when one pleases -- only so far restrained as the Rights of others may make it necessary for the welfare of all other citizens. The Right of the Citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, by horsedrawn carriage, wagon, or automobile, is not a mere privilege which may be permitted or prohibited at will, but the common Right which he has under his Right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Under this Constitutional guarantee one may, therefore, under normal conditions, travel at his inclination along the public highways or in public places, and while conducting himself in an orderly and decent manner, neither interfering with nor disturbing another's Rights, he will be protected, not only in his person, but in his safe conduct." American Jurisprudence 1st. Constitutional Law, Sect.329, p 1135.
"Fundamentally it must be recognized that in this country "Highways are for the use of the traveling public, and all have ... the right to use them in a reasonable and proper manner, and subject to proper regulations as to the manner of use." (13 Cal.Jur. 371, sec. 59) "The streets of a city belong to the people of the state, and the use thereof is an inalienable right of every citizen, subject to legislative control or such reasonable regulations as to the traffic thereon or the manner of using them as the legislature may deem wise or proper to adopt and impose." (19 Cal.Jur. 54, sec. 407) "Streets and highways are established and maintained primarily for purposes of travel and transportation by the public, and uses incidental thereto. Such travel may be for either business or pleasure ... The use of highways for purposes of travel and transportation is not a mere privilege, but a common and fundamental right, of which the public and individuals cannot rightfully be deprived ...[A]ll persons have an equal right to use them for purposes of travel by proper means, and with due regard for the corresponding rights of others." (25 Am.Jur. 456-457, sec. 163; see, also, 40 C.J.S. 244-247, sec. 233.)" Escobedo v. State of California (1950), 35 Cal.2d 870, 875-876.
http://login.findlaw.com/scripts/callaw?dest=ca/cal2d/35/870.html "It is well settled that, quite apart from the guarantee of equal protection, if a law "impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly secured by the Constitution [it] is presumptively unconstitutional." Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 76 (plurality opinion)." HARRIS v. McRAE, 448 U.S. 297 (1980)
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/printer_friendly.pl?page=us/448/297.html And there was NO VOLUNTARY, KNOWING & WILLING WAIVER of our RIGHT to use the roads for purposes of VEHICULAR TRAVEL.
"Waiver may be express or implied. (Waller v. Truck Ins. Exchange, Inc. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1, 31.) Generally, an implied waiver based on failure to assert a right, including a constitutional right, must be accompanied by an informed intent to relinquish that right.
(Id. at p. 31; North Carolina v. Butler (1979) 441 U.S. 369, 371, 374-375 [waiver implied where no invocation of right to counsel]; People v. Riva (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 981, 989 [waiver implied where defendant, who was not tricked or coerced, understood his rights
but chose to speak with police].)
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Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right; the foundation of waiver is intent. (Waller v. Truck Ins. Exchange, Inc., supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 31.)
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“Case law is clear that ‘“[w]aiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right after knowledge of the facts.” [Citations.] The burden . . . is on the party claiming a waiver of a right to prove it by clear and convincing evidence that does not leave the
matter to speculation, and “doubtful cases will be decided against a waiver” [citation].’ (City of Ukiah v. Fones (1962) 64 Cal.2d 104, 107-108 [48 Cal.Rptr. 865, 410 P.2d 369];DRG/Beverly Hills, Ltd. v. Chopstix Dim Sum Cafe & Takeout III, Ltd. (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 54, 60 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 515] [‘“‘Waiver always rests upon intent.’”’]; [citations].) The waiver may be either express, based on the words of the waiving party, or implied, based on conduct indicating an intent to relinquish the right. (Brookview Condominium Owners’ Assn. [v. Heltzer Enterprises-Brookview (1990)] 218 Cal.App.3d [502,] 513.)” (Waller v. Truck Ins. Exchange, Inc., supra, 11 Cal.4th 1, 31.)" PIONEER ELECTRONICS (USA), INC. v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, No. B174826 (Super. Ct. No. BC257222) (2005)
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/opinions/revpub/B174826.PDF "Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." BRADY v. U. S. , 397 U.S. 742 (1970)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/397/742.html At most the acceptance of the license created an IMPLIED CONTRACT that we AGREED to WHEN actually using the roads for the COMMERCIAL ACTIVTITY the license AUTHORIZES.
Express and implied. An express contract is an actual agreement of the parties, the terms of which are openly uttered or declared at the time of making it, being stated in distinct and explicit language, either orally or in writing. 2 BI, Comm. 443; 2 Kent, Comm. 450; Linn t Ross, 10 Ohio1 414, 3(3 Am. Dee. 95; Thompson v. Woodruff, 7 Cold. (Teno.) 401; Grevail v. Whateman, 32 Misc. Itep, 279, 65 N. V. Supp. 974. An implied contract is one not created or evidenced by the explicit agreement of the parties, but inferred by the law, as a matter of reason and justice from their acts or conduct the circumstances surrounding the transaction making it a reasonable, or even a necessary, assumption that a contract existed between them by tacit understanding. Miiler’s Appeal, 100 Pa. 568, 4o Am. Rep. 394; Wiekham v. WeB (Com. P1.) 17 N. V. Supp. 518; Hiokle v. Sage, 67 Ohio St 256, 65 N. B. .099; Power Co. v. Montgomery, 114 Ala. 433. 21 Sonth. 960; Railway Co. v. Gaffuey. (15 Ohio St. 104, 61 N. B. 152; Jennings v Bank, 79 Cal. 323, 21 Pac. 852, 5 L. R A. 233, 12 Am. St. Rep. 145; Denne v. Hodge, 35 Miun. 146, 27 N. W. 917, 59 Am. Rep. 321; Bixby v. Moor. 51 N. H. 403. Implied contracts are sometimes subdivided into those “implied in fact” and those “implied in law,” the former being covered by the definition just given, while the latter are obligations imposed upon a person by the law, not in pursuance of his intention and agreement, either expressed or implied, but even against his will and design, because the circumstances between the parties are such as to render it just that the one should have a right, and the other a corresponding liability, similar to those which would arise from a contract between them. This kind of obligation therefore rests on the principle that whatsoever it is certain a man ought to do that the law will suppose him to have promised to do. And hence it is said that, while the liability of a party to an express contract arises directly from the contract, it is just the reverse in the case of a contract “implied in law,” the contract there being implied or arising from the liability. Musgrove v. Jackson, 59 Miss. 3.02; Bliss v. Hoy, 70 Vt. 534, 41 Atl. 1026; Linn v. Ross, 10 Ohio, 414, 36 Am. Dec. 95; People v. Speir, 77 N. V. 150; O’Brien v. Young, 95 N. V. 43, 47 Am. Rep. 64. But obligations of this kind are not properly contracts at all, and should not be so denominated. There can be no true contract without a mutual and concurrent intention of the parties. Such obligations are more properly described as “quasi contracts.” WiIlard v. Doran, 48 Hun, 402, 1 N. V. Supp. 588; People v. Speir. 77 N. V. 150; Woods v. Ayres, 39 Mich. 350, 33 Am. Rep. 396; Bliss v. Hoyt, 70 Vt. 534, 41 Atl. 1026; Keener, Quasi Contr. 5. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 2ND EDITION, CONTRACT, pg. 261-263
"The defendant, however, insists that some of the provisions of the statute are in violation of the Constitution of the United States, and if it obtained the required license, it would be held to have accepted all of its provisions, and (in the same words of the statute) 'thereby to have agreed to comply with the same.' 1. The answer to this suggestion is that the acceptance of a license, in whatever form, will not impose upon the licensee an obligation to respect or to comply with any provisions of the statute or with any regulations prescribed by the state railroad & warehouse commission that are repugnant to the Constituation of the United States. A license will give the defendant full authority to carry on its business in accordance with the valid laws of the state and the valid rules and regulations prescribed by the commission. If the commission refused to grant a license, or if it sought to revoke one granted, because the applicant in the one case, or the licensee in the other, refused to comply with statutory provisions or with rules or regulations inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States, the rights of the applicant or the licensee could be protected and enforced by appropriate judicial proceedings.” W. W. CARGILL CO. v. STATE OF MINNESOTA, 180 U.S. 452 (1901)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/180/452.html To me, the real problem is that the laws in question are VAGUE, OVERBROAD & being UNCONSTITUTIONALLY MISAPPLIED to the People in order to TAX & REGULATE us under a FICTION OF LAW.
